scientific journal Political Sociology of the Islamic Revolution

Abstract Today, one of the most influential factors in the economic development of countries is government policy, as governments have historically devoted significant attention to reforming economic structures and achieving development. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued a path of economic development within the framework of the “resistance economy” and has sought to implement this model in its macroeconomic policymaking. The present study, adopting a comparative and documentary approach, seeks to address the fundamental question of how the policies of the three governments—“Construction” (Sazandegi), “Reform” (Eslah), and “Justice-oriented” (Adalat-Mahvari)—differed and converged, and to what extent these policies aligned with the principles of the resistance economy. The findings indicate that, although all three administrations endeavored to realize and implement this paradigm in accordance with the guidelines of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, they achieved limited success in its effective and sustainable execution. Based on three key indicators—economic growth, inflation, and the Gini coefficient—the economic performance of these governments faced significant challenges. Consequently, not only were the objectives of the resistance economy only partially achieved, but adverse outcomes, such as an increase in social inequality and disruption of social balance, also emerged within Iranian society.

Abstract The Islamic Revolution of Iran (1979) represents a significant institutional rupture in Iran’s development trajectory, characterized not by a transition to an open access order but by the reinforcement of a limited access order within the framework of traditional-religious structures. This study employs Douglass North’s institutional framework to analyze the role of four key actors post-revolution—clergy and revolutionary institutions, the National Front and Freedom Movement, leftist factions, and technocrats from the Pahlavi regime—in perpetuating Iran’s underdevelopment. The findings indicate that the clergy, leveraging extensive social capital and robust informal institutional networks, successfully established new formal institutions and monopolized power resources within a limited access order. Conversely, other actors were marginalized due to their lack of entrenched institutional networks, limited social legitimacy, and inability to create or strengthen effective formal and informal institutions. The persistence of reliance on traditional-religious institutions, high transaction costs, and constraints on institutional competition have been major obstacles to the emergence of an open access order and sustainable development in Iran.